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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 During 2015, approximately 201 U.S. companies decided to go public in 
order to gain capital in return for stock shares. Out of these 201 companies, 127 
companies left an average of $46.5 million dollar on the table as a result of 
underpricing. There is a plethora of literature that shows underpricing is a result of 
many different variables, yet few analyze how underwriters relate to IPO 
underpricing. Through the use of correlation matrices, means difference tests, simple 
regressions, and multivariate regressions, this study finds that there is no statistically 
significant trend between underwriters and money left on the table. However, one 
point of interest for future studies would be to analyze the effectiveness of Singular 
Lead Underwriters versus Multiple Lead Underwriters while controlling for 
prestigious investment banks.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 In 1602, the Dutch East India Trading company produced a groundbreaking 
idea that would forever change the landscape of business. Their primary source of 
revenue came from sailing around the world to gather highly sought-after goods. 
With ships being pirated for their loot or lost to an unforgiving sea, the Dutch East 
India Trading company realized they were in grave financial risk if they wanted to 
keep funding these expeditions. In order to stay afloat, literally and figuratively, they 
sought out investors in exchange for a percentage of their company. This event is 
considered to be the first publicly traded company, therefore making it the first Initial 
Public Offering (IPO). Much has changed over the past 400 years, although 
conceptually the ideas pushing these types of financial events remain the same.  
In 2015, there were over 200 U.S. IPOs, which allowed companies to gain 
capital from investors in return for partial ownership. 2015 companies such as Fitbit 
saw an opportunity to sell shares to public markets and increase their capital. When 
a company chooses to go public, they are most often underwritten by a large 
investment bank. With the assistance of large investment firms such as Goldman 
Sachs, Deutsche Bank, or Morgan Stanley, companies going public can reduce their 
legal workload while mitigating their risk through an underwriter. However, a 
company going public may have multiple underwriters forming a syndicate in order 
to diffuse the risk amongst multiple investment banking firms.  
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As a company tries to find the right underwriter(s) to bring their shares to the 
public, many factors are considered, such as the issuing company’s price, size, age, 
number of shares, and industry. Companies that are recently incorporated or ones 
that already have a large net worth pose a higher risk due to respective margins of 
error. Although there are numerous factors that influence how an underwriter would 
price an IPO, these underwriters spend enormous amounts of money and hours trying 
to perfect this process. These underwriters or syndicates use many different 
techniques from analyzing cash flows, growth, or earnings per share, comparing the 
current company to others in the past, and checking dividend payments, if applicable, 
using a discounted dividend model. When the issuing company decides how many 
shares and at what price they would like to offer, the underwriter agrees to purchase 
the shares being allocated to the public market. Once the company’s issuing date 
arrives and the company goes public, then the underwriter resells them at a slightly 
higher price known as the underwriter spread. 
Despite all of these valuation methods from well-renowned underwriters, 
even seasoned investment firms continue to misprice the value of shares when 
underwriting IPOs. An underwriter could overestimate the offer price resulting in a 
decrease in share price once a company’s shares hit the market. If an underwriter 
underprices the offer amount for an IPO, then the market would increase the share 
price to the fair value. In the latter scenario, the price increase multiplied by the 
number of shares offered is considered Money Left on the Table (MLOT). Even 
though this is an increase in share price, it is often an unrecognized loss for these 
companies because they were not valued accurately initially and therefore never 
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received the capital. The term “Money Left on the Table” is referred to by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) as the difference between the first closing ask price minus the 
original offer price multiplied by the number of shares sold. The prevalence of 
companies leaving enormous amounts of money on the table is all too common 
across the market.   
Highly reputable investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley, are responsible 
for some of the most infamous examples of MLOT. Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
describe the process of Morgan Stanley underwriting the IPO for Netscape in August 
of 1995. With an approximate 108% increase in price on the first day, Netscape left 
$151 million on the table as a result of Morgan Stanley’s egregious underpricing. 
Netscape went on to retain them as their underwriter for a follow up offer that took 
place in November of 1996.  
Many investors do not realize how much more capital the company could 
gain because most investors are happy with the superficial gain in personal wealth 
due to a stock price increase according to Loughran and Ritter (2004). It is because 
of this universal mindset that most people make a tradeoff between the gain of their 
personal stock and MLOT. Rosenboom (2012) suggests that an underwriter’s 
decision on how much to resell the shares for on the primary market affects money 
left on the table. Others, such as Loughran and Ritter (2004), believe it is a result of 
a revision to the offer price after the preliminary prospectus. This study serves the 
purpose to fill a gap in analyzing the MLOT phenomenon by analyzing 2015 U.S. 
IPOs number of Underwriters, All-Star Underwriters, Lead Underwriters, Lead All-
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Star Underwriters, and Singular Lead All-Stars versus Multiple Leads with an All-
Star.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Many academic journals have proven that IPOs, in general, are underpriced. 
There have been a multitude of studies that are dedicating to assessing how and why 
IPOs are underpriced.  
Numerous scholars believe that underpricing is a deliberate strategic plan executed 
by managers of the firm going public and their underwriters. Hakenes and Nevries 
(2000) initially developed a model studying how underpriced IPOs may generate 
more media coverage. This additional coverage for a company going public would 
attract new customers looking to expose an arbitrage situation, and in return, increase 
the intrinsic value of the stock due to an increase in demand. Boehemer and Fishe 
(2004) continued off of this analysis to develop an alternative theory. They created 
a model to analyze if strategic underpricing, by the underwriter, creates a higher trade 
volume for a company going public. Higher trade volume would be highly beneficial 
to the underwriters for they hold the majority of shares being released to the public. 
With the underwriter being a basic market-maker, underwriters would be able to 
benefit from the increase in trade volume due to higher demand. Yet, their model 
showed no benefit of systematic underpricing for the underwriter. Aggrawal, 
Krigman, and Womack (2002) studied how managerial shareholding correlate with 
the IPO underpricing. Their model disproves the model presented by Hakenes and 
Nevries (2000) and shows that IPO underpricing is harmful to a firm’s intrinsic 
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value. They found a positive correlation between managers that have a high amount 
of shareholding and first-day underpricing. Their theory for this is that managers of 
a firm going public strategically underprice the value of the firm in order to get a 
higher personal gain in wealth.  
 Carpenter and Strauser (1971) studied firms going public and the advice that 
they receive from their auditors. They report that auditors of IPOs were suggesting 
that firms going public should change from local or regional underwriters to 
nationally recognized underwriters. Through the change to more prestigious 
underwriters that have national attention, they believe it instills a public perception 
of a higher quality IPO. If the public were then to believe that this IPO is of higher 
quality, then they would be willing to pay a higher price in order to gain access to its 
shares. Logue (1973) attributes underpricing to be a result of information asymmetry. 
With a firm going public for the first time, there is a high amount of uncertainty 
within the market about that firm. He continues to explain that firms going public 
may seek out a prestigious investment banking firm. By having a prestigious bank 
bringing a company to the market, he believes that it may instill confidence into that 
IPO. Investors would then assume that IPOs with prestigious underwriters have 
information of which the public is unaware, therefore inducing people to believe it 
is a good investment and to enter at a higher share price. Both Carpenter and Strauser 
(1971) and Logue (1973) explain that IPOs that are partnered with prestigious and 
well-known investment banking firms are viewed as more favorable to the public, 
which could increase their intrinsic value.  
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 Titman and Trueman (1986) examine how more prestigious underwriters 
influence information about the firm they are bringing public. Their analysis shows 
that the information in regards to valuation is important, yet having a prestigious 
underwriter shows a greater influence. An IPO with a higher-level underwriter 
indicates to the market that there is a more careful valuation. They conclude that this 
may account for some underpricing, yet it does not completely cover the scope of 
the issue. Carter and Manaster (1990) develop a more accurate way to assess a 
prestigious underwriter’s influence on an IPO. They create a system that ranks some 
of the more well-known underwriters with their associated reputation. Their 
conclusion is that prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk IPOs, 
therefore creating a market of investors that do not seek information about the IPO. 
By marketing a less risky IPO through a prestigious underwriter, underwriters are 
able to maintain their reputation. Since these IPOs are viewed as having less risk 
associated, investors feel that they are well-informed about the IPO and its price. 
With less perceived risk and more ‘accurate’ pricing, there is less price run-up once 
the firm goes public, thus reducing MLOT.  
Loughran and Ritter (2002) examine how IPO underpricing has grown since 
the turn of the century. They theorize that part of the underpricing issue could be 
because prestigious national investment banking firms are phasing out regional 
banks in the lead underwriting positions. During the internet bubble of 1999-2000, 
first-day returns were around 65% showing huge amounts of underpricing. They 
argue that these high amounts of money left on the table are due to firms going public 
being complacent with this loss. Continuing with their theory, firms going public 
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may incur MLOT as an indirect cost for having more reputable investment banking 
firms as their underwriters in order to boost public perception of the IPO. 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) studied how having more members in an 
underwriter syndicate effects an IPO offer price. Their study found that an IPO with 
a greater number of underwriters has a tendency to revise the offer price from the 
amount filed originally. Hu and Ritter (2007) analyze how price revisions affect the 
amount of money left on the table. Their empirical findings show that each additional 
underwriter increases the offer price for an IPO by 1%. They continue on to explain 
that IPOs that revise their offer price, prior to going public, left $23 million on the 
table whereas the average IPO from their study left approximately $9 million on the 
table. Other academic papers like those of Bradley and Jordan (2019) study different 
variables of shares allocated to the public, price revisions, and Venture capital-back 
firms. Their empirical finding shows that IPO underpricing can be predicted using 
price amendments as indicators. An amendment of filing price accounts for 
approximately 13% of the variation in underpricing in their model. 
The purpose of this study is to test how underwriters and all-star 
underwriters, within different underwriter positions, affects the amount of money left 
on the table. All-star underwriters are investment banking firms that received a 
reputation ranking of seven or higher in Ritter (2004). Logically, more underwriters 
would provide a higher level of assessment for a firm’s intrinsic value therefore 
reducing underpricing. Having the presence of prestigious investment banking firms 
(all-stars) should also reduce the amount of money left on the table, because they are 
more reputable firms with a higher level of expertise.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
3.1 Number of Total Underwriters 
 
 
Hypothesis 1) IPOs that have a higher number of Total Underwriters will result in 
lower amounts of Money Left on the Table. 
Underwriters are in charge of facilitating a company’s transition to becoming 
a public enterprise. Once a company and underwriter agree to bring shares to the 
public; the underwriter is in charge of the entire process, from start to finish. Legal 
consultation, valuation of the shares, promotion, and assumption of risk are all duties 
of the investment banking firm. While this is a wide array of responsibilities to fulfill, 
these underwriters are massive financial conglomerates that rely on highly skilled 
individuals to make these decisions on their behalf. Through this diffusion of risk 
and having other investment banking firms present, one would assume that more 
diligent and accurate valuation methods would be present with more underwriters. 
 Corwin and Schultz (2005) studied how having more members in an 
underwriter syndicate affects an IPO offer price. Their study found that an IPO with 
a greater number of underwriters has a tendency to revise the offer price from the 
amount filed originally. According to Hu and Ritter (2007), having an IPO 
underwritten by multiple book runners is a recent upward trend since 2001. This 
syndication allows for lower coordination costs and helps reduce risk through its 
dispersal amongst the multiple investment banking firms. However, Hu and Ritter 
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(2007) also shows that each additional underwriter raises the middle point of the 
filling price by 2.8% and 1% for the offer price. The upward revision of a price has 
an influence with the amount of money left on the table as IPOs with upward revision 
of share price resulted in an average of $23 million lost to underpricing. More MLOT 
as a result of upward price revision is due to the underwriters lack of confidence in 
the valuation of the company’s share price. Therefore, an IPO that has more 
underwriters, which contributes to an upward price revision, should leave more 
money on the table. Yet, this is not logical, for having more underwriters should 
contribute to more accurate information, thus reducing underpricing through creating 
a fair valuation.  
Even with specialization, access to incredibly powerful tools, and seasoned 
experience, these underwriters still struggle to make a fair offer price. There can be 
a general analysis for trends of underpricing against the total number of underwriters 
used for an IPO because of this initial hypothesis. A wide scope of how underwriters 
influence MLOT will create an effective starting point where more elaborate 
hypotheses can be revealed for different variables. 
3.2. Number of Total All-Star Underwriters 
 
 
Hypothesis 2) IPOs that have a greater number of Total All-Star Underwriters will 
result in lower amounts of Money Left on the Table. 
 As an IPO makes its selection of underwriters, they may be tempted to 
include a highly reputable investment banking firm. Carter and Manaster (1990) 
created a ranking for investment banking firms in order to analyze why IPOs choose 
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more prestigious bankers to bring their firm public. Their theory continues to say 
that IPOs seek out reputable investment banking firms in order to reduce the IPOs 
public perception as a risky investment. The model created for their study shows that 
there is a positive correlation between prestigious investment banking firms and low 
risk IPOs. If these All-Star Underwriters are associated with less risky IPOs, than 
there will be less price run-up which would reduce underpricing. Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) create a more recent underwriter reputation ranking that acknowledges 
adjustment from the original data of Carter and Manaster (1990). Through the use of 
these ranking systems, this study analyzes the effect of having underwriters that are 
all-stars (rank 7.0 and greater) on how much money is left on the table. 
 Cliff and Denis (2004) explain how IPOs indirectly pay for All-Star 
Underwriters through money left on the table. They continue to explain how after a 
firm goes public, the underwriters provide analyst coverage on the performance of 
the IPO. Analyst coverage contributes to the success of a firm’s stock price when it 
comes from prestigious investment banking firms. Therefore, a company going 
public ignores the money left on the table in order to receive analyst coverage about 
their upward trending stock from these all-stars, which boosts the public perception 
of both parties involved.  
Due to this gap of knowledge, the second, and more focused hypothesis, of 
this study is based on how the Number of All-Star Underwriters influences an IPOs 
underpricing. There will be an analysis of how the Number of All-Star Underwriters 
involved in the syndicate of an IPO will affect how much money a firm leaves on the 
table. Logically, more highly reputable investment banking firms would result in a 
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higher level of expertise and therefore, a more accurate offer amount reducing 
MLOT. 
3.3 All-Stars in a Lead Underwriter Position 
 
 
Hypothesis 3) IPOs with a greater number of Lead All-Star Underwriters will reduce 
MLOT in the highest amount.  
Sharma and Seraphim (2010) studied IPOs in the Indian market to see if 
having an all-star in the syndicate would help narrow the gap of underpricing. They 
found that there was an inverse relationship between IPOs with reputable investment 
banking firms and underpricing. Additionally, they found that an offer price was 
more rationally valuated when performed by all-star underwriters. Furthermore, they 
suggested that IPOs without an all-star should form a syndicate of multiple 
underwriters in order to try and replicate the results. Yet, they did not analyze how 
having a Lead All-Star Underwriter would influence the accuracy of an IPO’s offer 
price. 
 Mola and Loughran (2004) found that in a seasoned equity offering, bringing 
more shares public for a company that is already publicly traded, it is more likely to 
have underpricing if the lead underwriters are considered all-stars. Yet, this study 
did not analyze how Lead All-Star Underwriters impact underpricing for an IPO. 
Neither Carter and Manaster (1990) or Loughran and Ritter (2004) analyze if having 
more all-stars in a lead underwriting position is beneficial to an IPO. For this 
hypothesis, IPOs with a greater number of Lead All-Stars Underwriters are 
considered to have a higher amount of expertise than the rest of the field. Yet, Liu 
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and Ritter (2011) provide empirical evidence that IPOs are more underpriced when 
they receive coverage from an all-star analyst that has expertise in an industry. 
However, this defies the simple logic for an IPO to seek out a Lead All-Star 
Underwriter, for having a prestigious underwriter in the lead position should 
drastically reduce the amount of MLOT. If an IPO has a greater number of Lead All-
Stars Underwriters, than additional expertise should lower MLOT, in the highest 
amount, if there are more prestigious investment banking firms in a lead position. 
3.4 Multiple Lead Underwriters with All-Star(s) and Singular Lead All-Star 
Underwriter 
 
 
Hypothesis 4) IPOs having Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star or a 
Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter will leave less money on the table than the rest 
of IPOs. 
 Between 2001 and 2010, nearly half of all IPOs in the United States were 
managed by a syndicate of underwriters that had more than one lead underwriter 
according to Jeon, Lee, Nasser, and Via (2013). With Hu and Ritter (2007) describing 
that more and more IPOs have been using syndicates as their preference, this study 
saw an opportunity to research these two specific groups. Adding the variables of a 
Singular Lead All-Star versus Multiple Leads with an All-Star could provide more 
insight into what underwriter construct produces the most accurately priced IPO.  
 When bringing these private companies public to the primary market, there 
is usually a Lead Underwriter that assumes most of the risk for this company. In 
some situations, the Lead Underwriter is a singular investment banking firm that 
assumes all of the risk for the company that it is bringing public. On the other hand, 
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Multiple Lead Underwriters evaluating the company and issuing the shares is very 
common. From the two scenarios, another element is added so that there may be a 
more in-depth analysis. For the IPOs that have Multiple Lead Underwriters (any 
amount greater than one), sub-groups were created for Multiple Lead Underwriters 
that contained an All-Star and those that did not. With the Singular Lead 
Underwriters, they are separated into sub-groups where the Singular Lead 
Underwriter was either an All-Star or not.  
The original intuition of this hypothesis is that any IPO that has an all-star in 
the lead position, multiple or singular, would leave less money on the table than its 
counterpart. Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter should be the most effective 
representative from the group of IPOs that have one lead underwriter due to the 
prestigious sole underwriter. Additionally, the study chose to use a Multiple Lead 
Underwriter with an All-Star, because it allows the inclusion of IPOs that have 
multiple lead underwriters and only one All-Star. These Multiple Lead Underwriters 
with an All-Star may have more than one prestigious bank, however they should still 
be the best representatives from the IPOs with multiple investment banks in the lead 
role. Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star should also leave less money on 
the table than singular leads due to an increase of resources and capabilities that are 
at the helm of bringing a stock public.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
The sample selection used in the analysis begins on January 1, 2015 and 
continues until December 31, 2015. The sample period focuses on all of the Initial 
Public Offerings in the United States during this time, which was over 200 
companies. This was almost immediately narrowed down to 177 companies due to 
some issues with data. All of these companies were traded on the NASDAQ and the 
NYSE with the exception of a few. Through the NASDAQ’s online database, this 
study was able to access information about these IPOs and the characteristics 
surrounding them. The companies were manually entered into an Excel sheet in the 
order they went public. After acquiring the names of the companies, the data set 
expanded to their respective tickers, date of publicity, offer price, and shares offered. 
All of the variables were available through the NASDAQ database, with the 
exception of a few companies, which required manual entry to their respective 
company in Excel.   
NASDAQ’s database also allowed the data set to include the total Number of 
Underwriters to have a base reference as to how many total investment firms were 
involved in any of the IPOs. The names of all Underwriters were included, along 
with a column that was to represent the numerical amount of the IPO’s syndicate. 
The total Number of Lead Underwriters was made into a different data entry as they 
were distinguished in NASDAQ’s database. There was also a numerical column 
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created for the total Number of Lead Underwriters in order to have a continuous 
variable for later analysis. All the information gathered through the NASDAQ 
database was hard data that had to be collected, transferred, and organized manually 
into Excel. 
 Using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the data set grew 
to include the Permanent Number (a unique identification number) and the Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) code to allow for some more distinct characteristics 
about the existing data. The Center for Research in Security Prices also gave the final 
closing ask price for the day that a company administered its IPO. Receiving the first 
day closing ask price was a vital step for the study because it allowed for the Money 
Left on the Table column to be calculated for meaningful data. CRSP provided a 
more seamless transition into the working data set as these values were selected in 
the database then exported into an Excel sheet.  
 When running initial descriptive statistics and simple regressions, the 
numbers returned seemed to be heavily skewed by some of the values. Upon 
revisiting the original data set, this study saw that there were negative data values in 
the Money Left on the Table column that are a result of overpricing. While 
overpricing is still a pertinent issue for IPOs and the underwriters pricing them, this 
study’s scope is more focused on MLOT which is due to underpricing. This paper 
addresses the different effects of overpricing and underpricing on companies going 
public in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. It is because of this discrepancy that a separate 
data set was created including only the positive values for MLOT (an underpriced 
offer amount). This data set still has all of the same characteristics of the original 
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data set but includes only 127 companies with positive amounts of money left on the 
table. It is for this reason that all tables and regressions, except for the Descriptive 
Statistics and Correlation Matrices, are from the ‘Positive’ data set. The Positive data 
set will be the most pertinent to this study, however it is important that all IPO data 
from 2015 be acknowledged. 
 
 
4.1 2015 Initial Public Offerings 
 
 
 The initial number of 201 companies was a very substantial original data set 
to analyze. However, some of these companies were removed from the data set for a 
number of reasons. After these discrepancies, the number of companies from 2015 
remaining in the positive data set had dropped down to a total sample of 127. Out of 
the 127 companies, 89 companies were traded on the NASDAQ and the remaining 
38 companies were traded on the NYSE. 
The major components of an Initial Public Offering are offer (share) price, 
shares offered, and the offer amount. The offer amount is dependent on its two inputs 
being offer price and shares offered. 
Offer Amount = Offer (Share) Price * Shares Offered 
Table 1A of the Appendix A (see Appendices for all future tables) reports descriptive 
statistics for the IPOs of 2015 from the Positive data set. For share price, the mean 
was $15.26 with a maximum value of $52.00 and a minimum value of $4.00 per 
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share. The mean number of shares offered to public had a mean of 10,185,263 shares, 
with a maximum of 48,000,000 shares and a minimum of 683,250 shares. In regard 
to offer amount, the mean was $171,409,830 with a maximum of $1,203,500,000 
and a minimum of $4,099,500. The offer amount had a high standard deviation of 
$210,783,386, showing that there is a skew in the data as a result of a very high offer 
amount.  
4.2 Underwriters and Lead Underwriters 
 
 
 After the total Number of Underwriters was assigned to each company, the 
Number of Lead Underwriters was extracted and entered as a separate data column. 
In reference to Panel A of Table 1 for descriptive statistics on Positive Data 
Underwriters, the median number of total underwriters was four with a maximum of 
17 and a minimum of one. For lead underwriters, the median was two with a 
maximum of five and a minimum of one. The median value is used in future 
calculations because the mean is not an integer and using fractions of underwriters 
is not a realistic value. It is through the creation of these inputs that this study aims 
to use the continuous variables as points of immediate comparison for money left on 
the table. Take Facebook, for example, which went public in May of 2012. When 
going public, Facebook had three lead underwriters and 34 total underwriters 
bringing them public. To date, Facebook is known as one of the most disastrous IPOs 
due to the underwriters not being able to create an accurate price, and constantly 
revising it prior to going public.  
 
4.2.1 All-Star Underwriters 
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 The All-Star variable was then added to the data for a more accurate 
representation of how a more reputable investment banking firm may be able to 
influence a fair share price. In reference to the Carter and Manaster (1990) reputation 
ranking, along with the edits made by Ritter (2004), this study was able to determine 
Number of All-Star Underwriters for 2015 U.S IPOs. Both Carter and Manaster and 
Ritter describe an All-Star underwriter to have a reputation ranking of eight and 
above (on a scale of zero to nine). Yet, our study decided to change the cut-off to any 
underwriter with a ranking of seven to nine in order to widen the scope of all-stars. 
It was through referencing this document and the data described in the former 
paragraph that the Number of All-Star Underwriters came to fruition. Table 1B 
shows that the median Number of All-Star Underwriters is three with a maximum of 
12 and a minimum of zero.  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Lead All-Star Underwriters  
 
 
In order to distinguish an IPO’s underwriter even further, the Lead All-Star 
Underwriter variable was created. A Lead All-Star Underwriter is an investment 
banking firm that is distinguished as the lead underwriter, singular or multiple leads, 
and has a reputation ranking based on Ritter (2004) greater than or equal to seven. 
Just as an IPO may have multiple All-Star Underwriters, they may also have multiple 
Lead All-Star Underwriters as some larger IPOs usually have a syndicate bringing 
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them public. Panel A of Table 1 shows that of the mean of Lead All-Star Underwriter 
is 1.56 with a median of two. Any IPO with more than two Lead All-Star Underwriter 
is going beyond the benchmark of Lead All-Star Underwriter and should have less 
underpricing. 
 
4.2.3 Singular and Multiple Underwriters 
 
 
 In addition to this data about All-Star Underwriters and Lead All-Star 
Underwriter, this study saw an opportunity to give further differentiation to these 
existing values. In order to have a more efficient way to distinguish Singular Lead 
Underwriters from Multiple Lead Underwriters, the study turned to binary codes. 
For an IPO that has one investment banking underwriter, like Presbia LLC, the 
column for singular lead (SL) would be assigned a ‘1’ and the multiple leads (ML) 
column would have a ‘0’ value. If there was an IPO that had five lead underwriters, 
like Patriot National Corp., then the SL column would receive a ‘0’ and the multiple 
leads (ML) would get a ‘1.’ 
 The data set also included binary options to show whether the IPO had a lead 
all-star underwriter within the SL and ML columns. Respectively, if the singular lead 
underwriter is an all-star (seven or greater on the Ritter Rank) then that data entry 
would be assigned a ‘1’ to the Singular Lead All-Star (SL All-Star) and the Multiple 
Lead All-Star column would receive a ‘0’. If any of the Multiple Lead Underwriters 
are an all-star, then the SL All-Star column would receive a ‘0’ and the multiple lead 
all-star (ML All-Star) would get a ‘1’. If there are singular lead underwriters or 
multiple lead underwriters that did not have a lead all-star present, then they would 
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receive a ‘0’. See the example 1 below of how the data entries were made. Also note 
that the table above has removed some elements of the data set in order to convey a 
clearer depiction of the underwriter formatting. 
Data Example 1: Other Columns and Variables Removed to Show Underwriter 
Formatting 
 
 It is from the various data entries that this study aims to create a supplemental 
comparison of how underwriters may influence the amount of money left on the 
table. Since the aim of this study is rather large in its scope, breaking down the 
underwriters into subgroups was a logical step for evaluating data. Also, in efforts to 
make data more digestible, the subgroups were made so that there is a clear point of 
comparison between the two; i.e., having a lead all-star underwriter or not. Different 
subgroups are a vital factor for this study because it allows for the separation of data 
and results for clear interpretations.  
4.3 Money Left on the Table 
 
 
The MLOT variable is the most crucial to this study. The origination of this 
variable came from multiple academic journals that address how underpricing results 
in higher amounts of MLOT. It starts with the underwriters accepting to take a 
company, and its shares, to the public market. From there, the investment banking 
firm assesses the company’s financial statements and performs valuation methods 
(those mentioned earlier in the paper) to reach a “fair” market price. Once the 
Firm	Name Number	of	Underwriters	 Total	Number	of	AllStars Is	SL	an	All-Star Are	any	of	ML	an	All-Star Total	Number	of	Lead	Underwriters Total	Number	of	Lead	AllStars	
COUNTY BANCORP, INC. 2 1 0 1 2 1
PATRIOT NATIONAL, INC. 5 3 0 1 3 1
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investment banking firm has determined the market value of an IPO’s shares, the 
underwriter then purchases those shares from the company going public at that price. 
In assuming this risk, the underwriter must be compensated, therefore a small 
premium is added to each share price. The new share price, including the premium, 
then hits the market with the underwriter pocketing each premium for all of the 
shares they are technically reselling. However, this premium is not accounted for in 
MLOT, because the determinants of MLOT are once the shares go public. An IPO 
leaves money on the table when they enter the market at the offer price, determined 
by the underwriter, and there is a large increase in share price during the first day of 
trading.  
Example: MLOT comes into action once the stock actually hits the market. 
Take Company XYZ that has an underwriter determining that its offer price should 
be $10 per share for 1,000 shares. Company XYZ then goes public at $10 per share 
and within seconds the market has shot the price of Company XYZ’s stock up to $20 
per share. At this point in time, the market has self-corrected the share price of 
Company XYZ through the process of arbitrage. Arbitrage is when any buyer/seller 
seeks an opportunity to exploit a good that is mispriced. In the case of Company 
XYZ, a buyer would purchase the share at $10 only to immediately sell it back into 
the market at $20, because they believe there is someone willing to pay that price. 
Through arbitrage, the market has revealed Company XYZ’s shares to have an 
intrinsic value of $20 per share. In this scenario, Company XYZ saw a 100% increase 
in their share price, but as a result left approximately $10,000 on the table. While 
Company XYZ did not have a realized loss, they lost the opportunity for their shares 
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to be sold at the intrinsic value of $20 which would have given them $20,000 of 
initial capital, as opposed to the realized $10,000 they received.  
Once the participants in the market have used arbitrage strategies to expose 
an underpriced asset, the share price is now at what the market considers to be the 
intrinsic value. At the end of the first day when a company goes public there is a 
final closing ask price from the seller of the security. The closing ask price is the 
lowest price at which a seller of the stock is willing to execute the trade. The first 
day closing ask price minus the original offer price creates the difference for the IPO. 
Taking the spread multiplied by the number of shares brought to the public gives the 
amount of money left on the table: 
Money Left on the Table = (Final Ask Price - Offer Price) * Number of Shares 
Offered 
While this example is very controlled and may not address some other factors 
such as hot markets or industries, it still creates a picture about how much money a 
firm could miss out on as a result of underpricing. If most IPOs were to be fairly 
evaluated and have an accurate offer price, then these companies with millions of 
shares would see a much larger capital production. Scenarios, such as Company 
XYZ, are the reason that this study is focusing on the effects of underwriters with 
money left on the table. 
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4.3.1 Mispricing IPOs – Overpricing 
 
 
 The calculation featured above could result in a negative value depending on 
the IPOs pricing and performance. If an underwriter were to vastly overprice the 
offer amount, and there was a low final ask price, then the result of the above 
equation would be a negative number. However, this negative number is not money 
left on the table, but rather a loss to the company. This is important to acknowledge 
because Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, and Swaminathan (2004) find that the median 
US IPO firm is overvalued by about 50% relative to the industry that the company 
participates in. Therefore, if an entire industry, like pharmaceuticals, is overvalued 
than IPO overpricing may occur. The reason that these negative values remain in a 
different data set is because they still harm the company that is going public. Even 
though the number is negative, that does not mean underwriters were more accurate 
in their pricing than those that left money on the table. Underwriters are still 
responsible for the drop in stock price because of their overpricing.  
 In reference to Table 1B for the descriptive statistics (including the original 
177 IPOs for 2015), the minimum amount for the money left on the table variable is 
a bit misleading. It is technically not money left on the table; it is actually an 
opportunity cost that the company going public incurs. Furthermore, the term 
‘minimum’ is a bit confusing because this is actually the maximum amount that a 
2015 company loss due to overpricing. Yet, the least amount of money lost as a result 
of overpricing was $80,000 which is the most accurate pricing in 2015 and was for 
Ritter Pharmaceuticals. 
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4.3.2 Mispricing IPOs - Underpricing  
 
 
 On the other end of the spectrum are the positive values which is the orthodox 
MLOT. Entered into their own data set, the Positive Data allows for an analysis that 
only deals with IPOs that had MLOT as a result of their underwriters underpricing 
the IPO offer amount. With the underwriting valuing the offer price below the fair 
value, a situation of money being left on the table is created. Ritter and Loughran 
(2002) claim that IPOs on average are underpriced which means that there is a higher 
chance of most IPOs leaving money on the table. Even though these values are 
positive, and that the company saw a gain in their stock price, it can still be 
considered a loss. To paint a more accurate picture, return to the Netscape example 
presented in the introduction.  
Referenced in Loughran and Ritter (2002): 
...cofounder James Clark held 9.34 million shares (of Netscape). Based on 
the midpoint of the file price range of $12-$14, the expected value of his 
Netscape holdings was $121 Million at the time that the preliminary 
prospectus was filed. At the closing market price on the first day of trading, 
his shares were worth $544 million, a 350% increase in his pretax wealth in 
the course of a few weeks. So, at the same time that he discovered that he had 
been diluted more than necessary due to the large amount of the money left 
on the table, he discovered that his wealth had increased by hundreds of 
millions of dollars. Since he owned 28.2% of the company before going 
public, $43 million of the $151 million wealth transfer from pre issue 
shareholders to the new investors came out of his pocket. After the offering, 
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he owned 24.5% of Netscape, but if the same proceeds had been raised by 
selling 2.4 million shares at $58.25 instead of 5.0 million shares at $28.00, 
he would have owned 26.3%. (420) 
This is a real example of how underpricing an IPO can affect much more than 
just the share price. Mr. Clark ended up having an enormous personal gain in wealth 
but his actual influence in Netscape diminished as a result of systematic underpricing 
by Morgan Stanley. This incremental change in his percentage owned may not 
appear to be too detrimental, but when dealing with a company worth approximately 
$3 billion, the pennies tend to stack rather quickly. Having the Positive data set 
dedicated to analyzing MLOT allows for this study to use these numbers in a plethora 
of ways.  
Referencing Table 1A for descriptive statistics on MLOT, it can be seen that 
the mean amount in 2015 was a whopping $46,583,540. Looking at the same table, 
the median for MLOT is approximately $16 million. This is a very appropriate 
distribution for this variable because Loughran and Ritter (2002) show empirically 
that the average amount of money left is much higher than the median due to a few 
IPOs with large amounts of MLOT. To further this point, the standard deviation of 
this variable is $70,490,226. The maximum amount of MLOT is $359,532,250 with 
the Fitbit IPO. Within the ‘Positive’ data set, there was IPO that was priced perfectly 
(Franklin Financial Network) resulting in the minimum being zero.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 
 
5.1 Correlation Matrices 
 
 
 Simple correlation matrices were used to see the relationship of certain inputs 
against others. The inputs were as follows: Number of Shares, Offer Amount, 
Number of Underwriters, Number of All-Stars, and Money Left on the Table. Number 
of Shares and Offer Amount were chosen because it is assumed these factors 
contribute to the amount of Money Left on the Table. In reference to Panel A of 
Table 2, Number of shares had a correlation of 0.59 against MLOT, which is 
reasonable considering IPOs with more shares have a higher proportional risk. This 
situation is similar with offer amount, which has a correlation of 0.55 to MLOT. 
Again, this was not a surprise as companies that have a higher offer amount will be 
inherently tougher to value and have more risk associated with valuation. It is also 
important to note that with these two situations (Number of Shares & Offer Amount) 
there is a margin of error with pricing an IPO. As these two variables increase, so 
does the margin of error because of their size and complexity, which could contribute 
to MLOT.  
 Number of Underwriters and All-Stars were chosen to be the additional 
variables to align with the focus of this study. Table 2A shows that the number of 
underwriters has a correlation of 0.3 with MLOT. While this correlation does not 
seem to be too strong, it is still correlated with a medium strength. Many other factors 
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contribute to MLOT, but as Panel A of Table 2 shows, there is a relationship between 
Number of Underwriters and MLOT, ceteris paribus. This is higher than the same 
correlation in Panel B of Table 2, because the negative values of MLOT were pulling 
the mean down, therefore showing a weaker correlation. Even with the negative 
values present there is still a small correlation between Number of Underwriters, 
ceteris paribus.  
 Having the Number of All-Stars variable addresses the correlation between 
MLOT and how many all-stars were present for an IPO. Panel A of Table 2 shows 
that there is actually a higher correlation with MLOT and Number of All-stars than 
the relationship described in the former paragraph. Number of All-Stars has a 0.328 
correlation at a medium level, ceteris paribus. This is a very interesting correlation 
assuming that highly reputable underwriters should be the ones performing at a 
higher level and leaving less money on the table, as a result. Again, it is very 
reasonable that the correlation for this variable is higher in Table 2A than Table 2B, 
because of the negative MLOT values skewing the correlation. This is one of the 
reasons why this study created a positive data set.  
5.2 Difference Tests 
 
 
 Difference tests are used in this study to provide important statistics to 
compare different groups within a singular variable. It is used by taking one 
dependent variable and creating a parameter to produce two sub-groups. From there 
the independent variable of MLOT is analyzed for both groups and then compared. 
This simple test gives a chart for number of IPOs on either end of the parameter, the 
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mean MLOT for each group, and the statistical significance of these results. This 
study used this tool to assess multiple dependent variables all against the amount of 
MLOT for the respective group. 
 
 
5.2.1 Means Test for Number of Underwriters  
 
 
 A sample means test was constructed with the dependent variable being the 
Number of Underwriters with MLOT as the mean being tested. This test was 
constructed by breaking the Number of Underwriters’ variable into two subgroups: 
above or at and below to the median Number of Underwriters from the positive data 
set. Using the median of four is more effective because it is an integer and would not 
cause any discrepancies within the data. In reference to Table 4A, the number of 
IPOs with underwriters above the median is 58, and the number of IPOs with 
underwriters at or below the median is 69. For the IPOs above the median Number 
of Underwriters, the average amount of MLOT is $66,743,019. Whereas the IPOs at 
or below the median Number of Underwriters had a mean of $29,637,891 MLOT. 
This is a statistically significant result with a p-value .003, which is significant at the 
three-star level.  
 This difference test shows that there is a pretty even distribution of IPOs 
between the Number of Underwriters above or at and below the median. It also shows 
that, ceteris paribus, IPOs that have underwriters above the median leave, on 
average, more than double what the IPOs below the median Number of Underwriters 
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do in regard to MLOT. In this situation, more underwriters do not reduce the amount 
of MLOT; they actually increase it, all else equal. Therefore, IPOs should use fewer 
underwriters if they want to reduce their chance of underpricing, ceteris paribus.  
5.2.2 Means Test for Number of All-Stars 
 
 
 The next variable tested using a difference test was for the total Number of 
All-Stars present on an IPO. As mentioned in Table 1B, the median Number of All-
Stars from the positive data set is three all-stars. The median number was chosen for 
a few reasons, the first being that you cannot have a portion of an underwriter. It was 
decided that the parameters for these two tests were any IPOs having more than the 
median Number of All-Stars and the other IPOs that were either at or below the 
median of three. This study chose to have the lower bound to be at or below the 
median, because the IPOs that are at or below were in a similar circumstance of not 
having excess All-Stars. Yet, any IPO that goes beyond the median of three All-star 
Underwriters should be receiving extraordinary coverage from these additional all-
stars, therefore reducing underpricing. Using MLOT as the independent variable, the 
test was constructed to see if there were any statistically significant differences 
between the MLOT for IPOs having a Number of All-Stars greater than the median 
and those that do not.  
 This test provides this study with a statistically significant result. In reference 
to Table 4B, the amount of observations above the median of three all-star 
underwriters is 51 companies. The number of IPOs at or below the median of three 
all-star underwriters is 76. The mean amount of MLOT for those above the median 
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is $66,995,447, and for the companies at or below the median Number of All-Stars 
the mean is $32,886,075. The difference in MLOT between the two groups’ averages 
was $34,109,371.  
On average, IPOs with a total amount of all-stars above the median leave 
approximately $34 million more on the table than IPOs with all-stars amounting from 
zero to three. Table 4B has a t-stat of 2.74 and a p-value of .007, showing that this is 
a statically significant result at the three-star level. With this level of significance, it 
can be said that there is a notable difference with the average MLOT between the 
two groups. To extrapolate, IPOs that have four or more all-star underwriters 
underprice an IPO’s offer amount with an accuracy that averages to $34 million more 
MLOT than those with fewer or no all-stars, ceteris paribus. 
 
5.2.3 Means Test for Number of Lead All-Stars 
 
 
 In line with the hypothesis development, the next testable dependent variable 
is the number of Lead All-Stars. This specific test analyzes the effect of having more 
lead underwriters that are all-stars on the amount of MLOT. Table 1B shows that the 
median number of Lead All-Stars is two, which is why this study uses zero to two 
for the lower bound. It would be fair to assume that having an all-star, or multiple, 
in the lead underwriting position would create a more accurate IPO offer price, thus 
reducing the amount of MLOT.  
 Table 4C shows the difference of means test for this dependent variable. The 
sample amount that is above the median of two Lead All-Stars shows that there are 
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only 20 IPOs from the positive data set fitting these criteria. The remaining 107 have 
two or less Lead All-Stars present for their IPOs. The mean amount of MLOT for an 
IPO above the median for Lead All-Stars is $62,110,105 while those below the 
median had a mean of $43,681,378. Between these two sub-groups the difference of 
means was $18,428,726, which did not produce any results considered to be 
statistically significant. The t-stat was 1.07 with a p-value of 0.285. Even though 
these results are not statistically noteworthy, they still hold weight within the 
research questions of this study. For the positive data set of 2015 IPOs, it was learned 
that having more Lead All-Stars does not influence MLOT in either increasing it or 
reducing it. This returns to the concept of how much more sought after these all-star 
investment banking firms are for companies going public, yet Lead All-Stars 
underwriters make no beneficial impact for accurate pricing.  
5.2.4 Means Test for the Singular Lead All-Star 
 
 
After creating all of the inputs for the original data set, an additionally binary 
element was added for close juxtaposition. If there was only one lead underwriter, 
then that IPO was given a ‘1’ for the ‘Singular Lead’ column. Additionally, in order 
to distinguish these underwriters further, another binary column of ‘Singular Lead 
All-Star?’ was created. A 2015 IPO like Invitae Corp. was brought public with J.P. 
Morgan as the sole lead underwriter. For Invitae Corp. both the ‘Singular Lead?’ and 
‘Singular Lead All-Star?’ would have binary entries of ‘1’ to indicate their positive 
relation with these descriptions.  
 Table 4D shows the difference test between the means of IPOs that had 
Singular Lead All-Stars and those that did not (Singular Lead Non-All-Star or 
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Multiple Leads). There were only 19 IPOs that had an All-Star in the sole lead 
underwriting position and averaged $83,031,380 for MLOT, whereas the 108 IPOs 
not having a Singular Lead All-Star had an average of $40,171,420 for MLOT. This 
produced a statistically significant result that has a t-stat of 2.494 and a p-value of 
.014 which is significant at the three-star level. With Carter and Manaster (1990) 
saying that prestigious investment banking firms are less likely to take on risky IPOs, 
this number should be much lower than the rest of the fields. This means test for 
MLOT shows that Singular Lead All-Stars leave almost double the amount of MLOT 
compared to IPOs that have: Singular Lead Non-All-Stars, Multiple Leads without 
all-stars, and Multiple Leads with an All-Star. When analyzing this situation in a 
vacuum, Singular Lead All-Stars are, on average, half as effective in accurately 
pricing an IPO compared to the other potential lead underwriting groups. 
 
5.2.5 Means Test for Multiple Lead All-Stars 
 
 
 Table 4E has a very similar setup to the Table 4D with the only difference 
being that the dependent variable is now Multiple Leads with an All-Star. The binary 
entries are still used for both columns to represent their respective positive 
indication. For example, an IPO could have three lead underwriters with only one 
all-star and would produce a ‘1’ in both the ‘Multiple Leads?’ and the ‘Multiple 
Leads with an All-Star?’ columns. This decision was made because an all-star 
underwriter being part of multiple lead underwriters should ideally have more 
accurate pricing of IPOs than singular leads (All-star and Non-All-Star) and Multiple 
Leads without an All-Star. Continuing with Carter and Manaster (1990), if 
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prestigious underwriters only associate with less risky IPOs, then an IPO that has 
Multiple Leads with an All-Star should have accurate pricing. Having multiple lead 
underwriters and having at least one of them being an all-star should create the ideal 
complexion for firms going public. 
 Referencing back to Table 4E, it shows that the sample number (from the 
positive data set) of IPOs with Multiple Lead underwriters that include at least one 
all-star is 92 companies, while there are 35 IPOs that did not fit this description 
(Singular Leads, Singular Lead All-Stars, and Multiple Leads with no all-stars). The 
mean amount of MLOT for Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star is 
$45,010,306, whereas the opposing group had a mean of $50,718,897. The 
difference between these two groups was -$5,708,590, showing that Multiple Lead 
Underwriters with an all-star had less MLOT. Table 4E shows that this not 
statistically significance in the sense of their differences due to a -0.47 T-stat and a 
0.685 P-value. Yet, compared to the rest of the sample group, Multiple Lead 
Underwriters with an All-Star were the most effective in producing an accurate offer 
when assessing their means for MLOT. 
5.2.6 Means Test for Number of Lead Underwriters  
 
 
 The final difference test was made to analyze how the number of Lead 
Underwriters influences the amount of MLOT, ceteris paribus. Table 1B for the 
descriptive statistics of the Positive Data set shows that the median number of Lead 
Underwriters is two. To keep with the pattern of the past difference tests, the lower 
bound of the test consists of zero to two (median) Lead Underwriters. Any amount 
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of Lead Underwriters greater than the median of two is the upper group for they 
should be receiving higher than normal coverage from three or more Lead 
Underwriters.  
Table 4F shows that the number of IPOs with Lead Underwriters higher than 
the median is 34 companies. There are 93 companies that had two or less Lead 
Underwriters. The mean amount of MLOT by the group having more Lead 
Underwriters than the median is $54,012,341. For the IPOs having two or less Lead 
Underwriters, the amount of MLOT had a mean of $43,867,634. This amounts to a 
difference of $10,144,706, which proves to be not a significant result because of a 
0.72 t-stat and a 0.475 p-value. However, it can still be seen that having more Lead 
Underwriters does not necessarily make a difference in how much money is left on 
the table when compared to those with one to two Lead Underwriters, ceteris 
paribus. 
5.3 Regressions Analysis 
 
 
 These simple regressions were made with the data analysis function in Excel. 
They were performed only using the data from the Positive set and using MLOT as 
the independent variable. The purpose of this analysis is to see that if, ceteris paribus, 
there is a statistically significant correlation between MLOT and the dependent 
variable. These graphs also show how the dependent variables would influence the 
amount of money left on the table through the coefficient that is respective to them, 
all else equal.  
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5.3.1 Number of Underwriters 
 
 
Simple regressions were created to see if the data provided was statistically 
significant when regressed against the independent variable of MLOT. The Number 
of Underwriters that an IPO has is the dependent variable for this regression. When 
testing it, there was a statistically significant result for how the number of 
underwriters relates to the amount of MLOT. In reference to Table 3A, there is a p-
value of 0.0004 which is at the three-star significance level. This simple regression 
has an initial intercept of $10,305,596 for MLOT and each additional underwriter 
increases the amount of MLOT by increments of $6,735,817, ceteris paribus. IPOs 
for larger companies may have more underwriters and MLOT due to their high 
amount of complexity and risk. However, this regression still shows that there is a 
statistically significant result for MLOT being associated with more underwriters. 
5.3.2 Number of All-Stars 
 
 
 Using the same regression analysis tool in Excel, the independent variable of 
MLOT is constant, while the dependent variable is the Number of All-Stars 
participating in an IPO. this regression also produced a statistically significant result, 
like the test prior. In reference to Table 3B, there is a p-value of 0.0001 for this 
regression which is at the three-star significance level. Table 3B shows the initial 
intercept for MLOT is $17,044,217 and each additional All-Star Underwriter 
increases the MLOT by increments of $8,411,421, ceteris paribus. Both the intercept 
and the variable associated with the Number of All-Stars are higher than that of the 
Number of Underwriters. This may be because there are fewer All-Stars than 
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underwriters, in general, which would increase these values respectively. IPOs that 
are less risky are associated with prestigious investment banks and have an inverse 
relationship with underpricing. Yet, this model for the Positive data set of 2015 IPOs 
show that there is a positive relationship with MLOT and the Number of All-Stars 
with a three-star significance, ceteris paribus. 
  
5.3.3 Number of Lead Underwriters 
 
 
 Through the regression analysis tool in Excel, the amount of Money Left on 
the Table is along the Y-axis, with the dependent variable of Number of Lead 
Underwriters on the X-axis. Table 3C shows the results of this analysis and provides 
this study with a result that is not statistically significant. With a p-value of 0.65184 
and a t-stat of -0.453, this study can deduce that there is no influential correlation 
between the Number of Lead Underwriters and how much money is left on the table 
as a result of underpricing. However, Table 3C does show that as the Number of Lead 
Underwriters has an inverse relationship with MLOT. As the Number of Lead 
Underwriters increases in singular increments, the amount of money left on the table 
is reduced by $3,496,529. A reduction in money left on the table per increase in 
Number of Lead Underwriters is a very understandable relationship. This negative 
value is the first hint of an underwriter doing a beneficial job in producing a fair 
price, resulting in a lower amount of MLOT for an IPO, ceteris paribus. Having a 
reduction of MLOT per increase of Lead Underwriter is why this study broke an 
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IPO’s underwriters into sub groups so that they may be tested individually. 
Therefore, a more specific version of this test is applied to the next category.  
5.3.4 Number of Lead All-Stars 
 
 With the independent variable remaining as MLOT, the dependent variable 
for this regression is the number of all-stars that are in a lead underwriter position. 
Unlike the first two regression tests, this test was not statistically significant. In 
reference to Table 4D, there is a p-value of 0.136 which is outside the realm of 
statistically significant results. However, this finding can still prove to be very 
important to this study. Extrapolating off of the regression results for this 
dependent variable, it shows that the Number of Lead All-Stars has no influence on 
MLOT, ceteris paribus. Meaning that having an All-Star in a lead underwriting 
position neither benefits nor harm the IPO. These All-Stars with high reputations, 
charge high fees, and turn away companies that seem undesirable. Yet, if this 
Number of Lead All-Stars is not making a difference in the amount of MLOT, then 
companies seeking underwriters to go public should pursue lower level investment 
banking firms. Table 4C shows in comparison, that having more Lead 
Underwriters as opposed to Lead All-Stars would provide a more accurate pricing 
for a 2015 U.S. IPO, ceteris paribus. 
5.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
 
 The final test for this study was to use a multivariate regression analysis in 
order to encompass all the variables being tested. Due to the hypothesis development 
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described in Chapter II of this paper, the variables chosen for this test were: Offer 
amount, Number of Underwriters, Number of All-Star Underwriters, Number of 
Lead Underwriters, and Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters. These variables 
were thought of as the most influential in this spotlight study on Underwriters and 
their influence of MLOT. However, offer amount was included because a higher 
offer amount usually results in more MLOT, so it adds an additional control for 
testing the other variables. For this multivariable regression analysis, the independent 
variable is MLOT. The chart shows how these five variables influence the amount 
of MLOT altogether, not as isolated dependent variables.  
 Table 5 shows the output for this multivariate regression analysis using the 
coding program Statistical Analysis System (SAS). SAS takes all of these dependent 
variables and calculates their influence on the intercept (MLOT) while balancing for 
each dependent variable’s respective affect. This means that certain dependent 
variables have more influence on MLOT when isolated or in a vacuum, as opposed 
to the multivariate regression analysis which allows this study to see how all of these 
variables, when tested together, influence the amount of MLOT for the Positive data 
2015 U.S. IPOs.  
 Table 5 shows how all of these dependent variables come together. The first 
variable being offer amount is statistically significant, which is not a shock, for an 
IPO with a higher offer amount will have more MLOT due to their larger margin for 
error. None of the dependent variables thereafter are statistically significant, yet they 
still shine light on how underwriters can influence MLOT. In this model, the Number 
of Underwriters shows that each incremental increase in the total number of 
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investment banking firms actually decreases the amount of MLOT by $264,162 per 
underwriter. Table 5 also shows that each additional All-Star Underwriter decreases 
the amount of MLOT by increments of $4,589,297. Next, the Number of Lead All-
Stars actually reduces the most amount of money per increase in the dependent 
variable. Every additional Lead All-Star Underwriter assists in more accurate pricing 
which reduces the amount of MLOT by increments of $11,965,029. Finally, the 
Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters increases the amount of MLOT with each 
increase of the variable. For every additional Lead All-Star that 2015 IPOs had, the 
amount of MLOT will increase by increments of $11,277,245.  
 While none of these variables, besides offer amount, prove to be statistically 
significant results, this multivariable regression analysis still helps develop a wider 
picture for the process of underwriting an IPO. Table 5 shows that having more 
underwriters, as part of a syndicate, does produce a more accurate IPO price, but is 
not as effective as other dependent variables in this analysis. Having more All-Star 
Underwriters participating in an IPO does reduce the amount of MLOT, however 
having an All-Star in a lead underwriting position produces more MLOT, ceteris 
paribus. In this regression, it shows that for 2015 IPOs having more Lead All-Star 
Underwriter was not advantageous. Table 5 also shows that the most successful IPOs 
from 2015 were companies that had multiple All-Star Underwriters as part of 
syndicate and multiple Lead Underwriters that were not All-Stars. This correlates 
with the Means Difference test from Table 4E as Multiple Lead Underwriters with 
an All-Star had the most effective pricing of 2015 IPOs.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 In 2015, there were 201 companies that brought their enterprises to the public 
market in order to produce capital through the process of an Initial Public Offering. 
When these companies want to publicly exchange shares for capital on the public 
market, they are most often underwritten by a large investment banking firm. These 
underwriters provide companies seeking to go public with legal expertise, risk 
aversion, and the knowledge to price the shares for the IPO. However, most of these 
IPOs are dramatically underpriced resulting in a spread between the offer price and 
the final closing price on the first-day of trading. This spread results in Money Left 
on the Table, which is a loss in potential capital that goes unnoticed because of a 
more superficial gain in wealth. This study serves to fill a gap in knowledge about 
whether or not underwriters actually assisted a 2015 U.S. IPO with the amount of 
MLOT when going public.   
 The aim of this paper is to understand how Underwriters, Lead Underwriters, 
All-Star Underwriters, Lead All-Star Underwriters, and Singular Lead All-Star 
Underwriters versus Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star all influence how 
much Money is left on the Table for 2015 IPOs. Through the creation of data sets 
that incorporated multiple variables and different sub-groups, this study deduced that 
there is no statistically significant empirical result between these groups of 
underwriters and how they influenced MLOT.  
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However, there were certain aspects of this study that proved to be highlights 
of interest. Simple regressions from Tables 3A and 3B show that there are 
statistically significant results when testing the amount of MLOT against the Number 
of Underwriters and the Total Number of All-Stars, respectively (ceteris paribus). In 
the Means difference test these two variables had a tendency to leave more money 
on the table, yet when incorporated into the Multivariate Regression Analysis it 
showed to have the inverse effect. The Total Number of All-Stars succeeded in 
lowering the amount of MLOT when analyzed in the multivariate mode. 
 The Number of Lead Underwriters proved to be the most consistent variable 
through all of the tests. This group showed no significance in the Table 3F, resulting 
in no benefits associated with a greater Number of Lead Underwriters. Yet, when 
entered into the multivariate regression they reduced the most money left on the table 
per additional Lead Underwriter.  
 The Total Number of Lead All-Stars actually increased the amount of money 
left on the table. However, ceteris paribus, the means difference test in Table 3D 
does show that IPOs for 2015 with a Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter had the 
poorest methodology of accurate pricing. Against the rest of the data field, the 19 
IPOs with a Singular Lead All-Star Underwriter averaged more than double the 
amount of MLOT as all of the other groups. Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-
Star were the most successful group in analyzing the fair price of an IPO. The Means 
Difference test in Table 3E shows that there is no statistical significance for this 
result, yet Multiple Lead Underwriters with an All-Star had the lowest average. 
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 While the findings of this study were underwhelming in their statistical 
significance, the purpose of this study still has merit in its contribution to future 
studies. It is the hope that an additional study will be done on how underwriters, All-
Stars and not, influence the amount of MLOT relative to the IPOs offer amount. 
Appendix B shows the means difference tests for each distinctive group, yet the 
number is a percentage of the firm’s MLOT relative to their respective offer amount. 
Future studies will be able to control for proportional risk through the use of this 
standardized metric. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs 
 
A) Descriptive Statistics of IPOs for Positive Data Set (Positive Money Left on the Table values only) 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
B) Descriptive Statistics of Underwritrers for Positive Data Set (Positive Money Left on the Table values only)  
	
	
	
	
	
	
Variable Mean Median Std	Dev Maximum Minimum
Share	Price 15.26$																													 15.00$																										 6.95$																															 52.00$																															 4.00$																										
Number	of	Shares 10,185,263.39														 6,550,000.00														 9,698,587.70																 48,000,000.00																 683,250.00															
Offer	Amount 171,409,830.96$									 96,900,000.00$									 210,783,386.05$									 1,203,500,000.00$							 4,099,500.00$									
Money	Left	on	the	Table 46,583,540.25$											 16,032,000.00$									 70,490,226.44$											 359,532,250.00$											 -																															
MLOT/Offer	Amount	 30.07% 16.25% 38.96% 218.00% 0.00%
Descriptive	Statistics	for	2015	IPOs	-	Positives	Only	(N=	127)
Variable Mean Median Std	Dev Maximum Minimum
Number	of	Underwriters 5.39																																		 4.00																															 3.26																																		 17.00																																	 1.00																													
Total	Number	of	All-Stars 3.56																																		 3.00																															 2.77																																		 12.00																																	 -																															
Total	Number	of	Lead	Underwriters 2.11																																		 2.00																															 0.84																																		 5.00																																				 1.00																													
Total	Number	of	Lead	All-Stars 1.56																																		 2.00																															 0.97																																		 4.00																																				 -																															
Money	Left	on	the	Table 45,725,963.03$											 15,681,000.00$									 71,274,443.18$											 359,532,250.00$											 -																															
MLOT/Offer	Amount	 30.07% 16.25% 38.96% 218.00% 0.00%
Descriptive	Statistics	for	2015	IPOs	-	Positives	Only	(N=	127)
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2015 IPOs (Continued) 
 
C) Descriptive Statistics of IPOs for Original Data Set (Positive and Negative values) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D) Descriptive Statistics of Underwriters for Original Data Set (Positive and Negative values) 
	
	
	
	
	
	
Variable Mean Median Std	Dev Maximum Minimum
Total	Number	of	Underwriters 5.39 4.00 3.23 17.00 1.00
Total	Number	of	All-Star	Underwriters 3.34 3.00 2.75 12.00 0.00
Total	Number	of	Lead	Underwriters 2.18 2.00 0.95 6.00 1.00
Total	Number	of	All-Star	Lead	Underwriters 1.53 2.00 1.06 5.00 0.00
Money	Left	on	the	Table 30,610,219$								 5,400,000$													 65,192,952$														 359,532,250$			 (57,101,000)$	
MLOT/Offer	Amount 18.93% 7.80% 37.73% 218.00% -38.46%
Descriptive	Statistics	for	2015	IPOs	(N	=	177)
Variable Mean Median Std	Dev Maximum Minimum
Share	Price 14.91$																																																																								 14.00$																			 7.99$																								 68.56$																										 4.00$																			
Number	of	Shares 10,660,163																																																															 6,365,000													 14,608,120													 160,000,000														 683,250														
Offer	Amount 175,015,332.00$																																																				 88,235,280.00$		 265,837,707.00$		 2,560,000,000.00$		 4,099,500.00$	
Money	Left	on	the	Table 30,610,219$																																																												 5,400,000$										 65,192,952$										 359,532,250$												 (57,101,000)$				
MLOT/Offer	Amount 18.93% 7.80% 37.73% 218.00% -38.46%
Descriptive	Statistics	for	2015	IPOs	(N	=	177)
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TABLE 2: Correlation Matrices for 2015 IPOs 
 
A) Correlation Matrix for Positive Data Set (Positive Money Left on the Table values only) 
 
	
	
	
B) Correlation Matrix for Original Data Set (Positive & Negative Money Left on the Table values) 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Number of Shares Offer Amount Number of Underwriters Total Number of All-Stars Money Left on the Table
Number of Shares 1
Offer Amount 0.87046 1
Number of Underwriters 0.59665 0.69422 1
Total Number of All-Stars 0.59939 0.71490 0.91960 1
Money Left on the Table 0.59097 0.55087 0.30695 0.32795 1
Correlation Matrix - Positive Data Set
Number of Shares Offer Amount Number of Underwriters Total Number of All-Stars Money Left on the Table
Number of Shares 1
Offer Amount 0.93551 1
Number of Underwriters 0.57127 0.66084 1
Total Number of All-Stars 0.52481 0.64051 0.90072 1
Money Left on the Table 0.24339 0.29356 0.21167 0.27080 1
Correlation Matrix - Original Data Set
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TABLE 3: Means Difference Test for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set 
 
A) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of Underwriters 
 
	
	
B) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of All-Star Underwriters 
 
	
	
C) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters 
 
	
	
	
	
>=5 0-4
n = 58 n = 69
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value
 $     66,743,019.52  $        29,637,891.00 $37,105,128.52 3.05 0.003
Total Number of Underwriters 
>=4 0-3
n = 51 n = 76
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value
 $     66,995,447.87  $        32,886,075.92 $34,109,371.95 2.74 0.007
Total Number of All-Star Underwriters
>=3 0-2
n = 20 n = 107
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value
 $     62,110,105.18  $        43,681,378.58 $18,428,726.61 1.07 0.285
Total Number of Lead All-Star Underwriter
 51 
 
TABLE 3: Means Difference Test for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued) 
 
D) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Singular Lead All-Star Underwriters 
 
	
	
E) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Multiple Leads with an All-Star Underwriter 
 
	
	
F) Means Difference Test for MLOT by Total Number of Lead Underwriters 
	
	
 
SL All-Stars  NO SL All-Stars
n = 19 n = 108
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value
 $     83,031,380.62  $        40,171,420.18 42,859,960.44$  2.49 0.014
Singular Lead Underwriters Being an All-Star or Not
ML All-Stars No ML All-Stars
n = 92 n = 35
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value
 $     45,010,306.63  $        50,718,897.19 -$5,708,590.57 -0.41 0.685
Multiple Lead Underwriters Being an All-Star or Not
>=3 0-2
n = 34 n = 93
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value
 $     54,012,341.27  $        43,867,634.50 $10,144,706.77 0.72 0.475
Total Number of Lead Underwriters
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Regression	Statistics
Multiple	R 0.307
R	Square 0.094
Adjusted	R	Square 0.087
Standard	Error 67,355,236.52																																		 	
Observations 127
 
 
TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set 
 
A) Regression Analysis for Number of Underwriters and Money Left on the Table 
 
	
	
 
Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 1 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
	
	
VARIABLE Coefficients Standard	Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 10,305,596.03																																			 11,702,295.58				 0.881 0.3802
Number	of	Underwriters	 6,735,817.13																																					 1,868,030.26						 3.606 0.0004
Regression	Analysis	-	Number	of	Underwriters	
 53 
 
0
50000000
100000000
150000000
200000000
250000000
300000000
350000000
400000000
0 5 10 15
M
on
ey
 Le
ft 
on
 th
e 
Ta
bl
e
Total Number of AllStars
Number of All-Stars Line Fit Plot
Money Left on the Table
Predicted Money Left on the
Table
Regression	Statistics
Multiple	R 0.328
R	Square 0.108
Adjusted	R	Square 0.100
Standard	Error 66,857,514.28																																		 	
Observations 127
 
TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued) 
 
B) Regression Analysis for Number of All-Star Underwriters and Money Left on the Table 
 
	
 	
 
Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 2 
	
	
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
 
 
 
	
VARIABLE	 Coefficients Standard	Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 17,044,217.64 9,649,811.45								 1.766 0.0798
Total	Number	of	All-Stars 8,411,421.46 2,167,169.23								 3.881 0.0002
Regression Analysis - Number of All-Star Underwriters 
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Regression	Statistics
Multiple	R 0.040
R	Square 0.002
Adjusted	R	Square -0.006
Standard	Error 70,713,786.96																																			
Observations 127
TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued) 
 
C) Regression Analysis for Number of Lead Underwriters and Money Left on the Table  
 
	
	
 
Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 3  
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
VARIABLE Coefficients Standard Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 53,934,509.56 17,422,041.64     3.09576 0.00242
Total Number of Lead Underwriters (3,496,528.47)  7,730,739.70       -0.45229 0.65184
Regression Analysis - Number of Lead Underwriters
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Regression	Statistics
Multiple	R 0.040
R	Square 0.002
Adjusted	R	Square -0.006
Standard	Error 70,713,786.96																																			
Observations 127
TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Hypotheses for 2015 IPOs from Positive Data Set (Continued) 
 
D) Regression Analysis for Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters and Money Left on the Table 
 
	
	
Line Fit Plot Diagram – Graph 4  
 
	 	 	
	
	
 
 
 
	
VARIABLE Coefficients Standard Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 31,316,267.78 11,935,560.60     2.62378 0.00978
Number of Lead All-Stars 9,792,644.46   6,532,234.31       1.49913 0.13636
Regression Analysis - Number of Lead All-Stars
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TABLE 5: Multivariate Regression Analysis for 2015 IPOs (Positive Data Only) 
	
	
	
	
	
	
VARIABLE DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-stat p-value
Intercept 1 34,341,485                   16,615,183          2.07 0.0409
Offer Amount 1 0.21793 0.03658 5.96 <.0001
Number of Underwriters 1 (264,162)                       4,770,991            -0.06 0.9559
Number of All-Stars
Underwriters 1 (4,589,297)                    6,461,156            -0.71 0.4789
Number of Lead 
Underwriters 1 (11,965,029)                  10,303,295          -1.16 0.2478
Number of Lead All-Stars
Underwriters 1 11,277,245                   10,671,613          1.06 0.2927
Multivariate Regression Analysis for 2015 IPOs (Positive Data Set)
Root MSE             59,206,261 
Dependent 
Mean             46,583,540 
R-Square 0.3225
Adj R-Sq 0.2945
Coeff Var 127.09695
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL CHARTS AND FIGURES
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Table 6: Means Difference Tests for 2015 IPOs (Percentage Data from MLOT/Offer Amount) 
 
A) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of Underwriters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of All-Star Underwriters 
 
 
 
C) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of Lead All-Star Underwriters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
>=4 0-3
n	=	51 n	=	76
Mean Mean	 Difference t-stat p-value
26.92% 32.18% -5.26% -0.745 0.004
Total	Number	of	All-Star	Underwriters	Above	or	Below	Median	
>=5 0-4
n	=	58 n	=	69
Mean Mean	 Difference t-stat p-value
26.22% 33.31% -7.09% -1.021 0.002
Total	Number	of	Underwriters	Above	or	Below	Median	
>=3 0-2
n	=	20 n	=	107
Mean Mean	 Difference t-stat p-value
25.46% 30.93% -5.47% -0.575 0.078
Lead	Underwriters	All-Stars	Above	or	Below	Median
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Table 6: Means Difference Tests for 2015 IPOs (Percentage Data from MLOT/Offer Amount) Continued 
D) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Singular Lead All-Star Underwriters 
 
 
E) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Multiple Leads with an All-Star Underwriter 
 
 
 
F) Means Difference for Percentage of MLOT/Offer Amount by Total Number of Lead Underwriters 
	
	
	 	
	
SL	All-Stars No	SL	All-Star
n	=	19 n	=	108
Mean Mean	 Difference t-stat p-value
28.15% 30.40% -2.25% -0.231 0.601
Singular	Lead	Underwriters	Being	an	All-Star	or	Not
ML	All-Stars No	ML	All-Star
n	=	92 n	=	35
Mean Mean	 Difference t-stat p-value
26.63% 39.11% -12.48% -1.62 0.006
Multiple	Lead	Underwriters	Being	an	All-Star	or	Not
>=3 0-2
n	=	34 n	=	93
Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value	
23.79% 32.37% -8.58% -1.1 0.009
Total	Number	of	Lead	Underwriters
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